Last year we reported an experiment in which
false memories for pictures were induced in a group setting, and a clairvoyance
task was incorporated into the design. The results suggested that concealed
target pictures could encourage people to think they had actually seen
pictures when in fact they had only imagined them. To test this further
we have carried out two replications, one exact replication and one
with variations. This experiment is a variation on the previous one,
using individual instead of group testing.
Participants were thirty people, not including
psychology students, who were recruited from around the campus of the
University of the West of England. They were each tested on three separate
occasions over a period of about two weeks. During session 1, 24 stimuli
were shown on a computer screen for 10 seconds each, with a one second
inter-stimulus interval. Twelve familiar household objects were chosen.
Half were shown as pictures with the name of the object underneath;
for the other half only the name was shown and participants were asked
to imagine the object. The objects seen and imagined were reversed for
half the participants. Of the six words with pictures, two were shown
once, two three times and two five times. The names-only slides were
shown just once.
During this presentation an envelope containing
three pictures stood in front of the computer. These three pictures
corresponded to half of the objects which that particular participant
had been asked to imagine, and constituted the clairvoyance targets.
The envelopes were prepared by SB and an independent
assistant, wrapped in opaque black card and sealed inside two envelopes.
SB had nothing further to do with the experiment until testing was complete.
The set of envelopes was kept locked up by KG. After viewing the presentation
the participant filled in the Belief in the Paranormal Scale and answered
a series of questions concerning details of each of the objects seen
or imagined.
Approximately a week later the participants
returned for session 2. and answered another set of questions about
the objects (no reminder was given that some were actually seen and
some only imagined). KG ran sessions 1. and 2.
Another week later they returned for session
3. in which they answered a third set of questions about the objects
and then completed a final questionnaire which asked them to identify
which objects they thought they had actually seen and which they had
only imagined. They were then debriefed and the purpose of the experiment
explained. The final session was run by NR who had had no possible access
to the targets. Data from this session was entered into the computer
by NR and kept separate from the rest of the data until both sets had
been independently copied and could be brought together for checking..
If participants said they had seen a picture
when they had actually imagined it this was counted as a false memory.
The number of false memories for pictures corresponding to clairvoyance
targets was compared with those not corresponding to targets.
We made two predictions. First, if confusions
between reality and imagination are psi-conducive because people falsely
interpret normal events as paranormal then we would expect a positive
correlation between belief in the paranormal and the number of false
memories, or between belief in the paranormal and confidence in the
false memories. Second, if confusions between reality and imagination
are actually psi-conducive then we would expect more false memories
on the target than non-target objects.
We failed to obtain reliable ESP results because
of a computer error in displaying the pictures. False memories were
successfully obtained but there was no correlation between these and
belief in the paranormal.
We wish to thank the Perrott-Warrick for financial support.
