This is the version originally submitted. It was
slightly edited before publication.
Sheldrake’s two papers are so deeply confused
that they should never have been published in JCS. Given that they
are published I shall discuss just two worrying confusions; one from
each paper.
In Part 1. Sheldrake consistently mixes up the
sense of being stared at that derives from the normal senses of
vision or hearing, with a putative sense that he claims can operate
without normal sensory cues. He might have avoided confusion by
giving a name to this proposed paranormal sense, and then made
clear, throughout the paper, which he was referring to at different
times, but he did not. The reader might try to understand the paper
by assuming that when Sheldrake talks about “the sense of being
stared at” he always means this proposed paranormal sense, but this
is not so; he uses the same phrase to refer to the normal sense. For
example, in the opening quotation from Conan Doyle the man looks up
to meet the eyes of the person staring at him, implying that the
starer was probably visible in peripheral vision.
This confusion permeates the paper. Detectives
should not stare at someone’s back for the obvious reason that they
might not be able to avert their gaze fast enough, or convincingly
enough, if the person happens to turn round. Detection with
binoculars might seem impossible by normal means, but binocular
lenses can have highly reflective surfaces and may look like eyes
from a distance. The surveys discussed seem to include some
questions that refer only to a paranormal sense and some that might
include normal sensing. This means that when Sheldrake discusses the
evolutionary function of the sense of being stared at the reader
cannot tell whether he means a normal or paranormal sense. Obviously
there would be an evolutionary advantage in being able to detect
another’s gaze and in fact we, and other species, have visual
systems designed to be good at this. A pair of eyes is a salient
stimulus. We can pick it out easily from complex scenes, attention
is automatically drawn to it, and eye movements are made towards it
without prior identification. We can also tell from very small
differences whether someone is looking straight at us and focussing
on us, or not.
Sheldrake asserts that research has neglected
the sense of being stared at because people believe it is
impossible. Unless he makes it clear that he is referring to a
paranormal sense, this claim is ridiculous. He also refers to a
taboo against psychic phenomena. As a former parapsychologist, I do
not believe there is any such taboo. The fact is that evidence for
paranormal phenomena is weak and usually unreplicable, and there is
no plausible theory to explain such evidence as there is. Most
scientists choose not to investigate paranormal claims, not because
of a taboo, but because they have more promising and exciting things
to spend their precious time and research resources on.
There follows a review of experiments some of
which were done under conditions that would rule out the use of the
normal senses, and some of which would not. Sheldrake admits to the
flaws in some of these experiments but then goes on to use all of
them – flawed or not – for his assessment of the overall pattern of
results. He also gives detailed results of some highly flawed
studies but then gives only a cursory description of experiments
that would, if valid, be very impressive.
Finally, Sheldrake’s conclusion reveals the
same confusion. Of course most people say they have sensed when they
are being stared at. It is a normal, evolved, human talent. Whether
there is also a paranormal ability to detect staring, as Sheldrake
seems to believe, remains unknown, but we will not get closer to
knowing the truth by reading this misleading and confused paper.
..........................................................................
In part 2 the entire discussion is marred by a
confusion between active v. passive theories and intromission v
extramission theories. Sheldrake points out that intromission
theories have tended to regard vision as passive while extramission
theories have tended to regard it as active. This may be true as a
historical fact but this is no reason to conflate two fundamentally
different distinctions. All modern theories of vision are
intromission theories; they assume that light enters the eye and
that nothing leaves it. This fits with the physics of light, the
structure of the eye, and the principles of sensory systems. Any
theory that proposes, as Sheldrake does, that “An influence seems to
pass from the observer to the observed” is a paranormal theory. The
problem for normal theories of vision is to understand how incoming
information eventually leads to visually guided behaviour and visual
experience, and they vary from more active to more passive theories.
There has recently been a revival of Gibson’s ecological approach to
vision and renewed enthusiasm for so-called active and embodied
theories of vision, but these do not involve anything leaving the
eye and projecting out into the world; their main point is to
emphasise how much active processing of the incoming information has
to be achieved.
The most extreme of these theories is probably
O’Regan and Noe’s sensorimotor theory of vision. This does away
entirely with any notion of a picture-like representation in the
visual system and replaces it with the idea that vision is a kind of
action; seeing is doing. As they put it, seeing is mastering
sensorimotor contingencies, or playing with the relationships
between one’s own actions and the changing input. This is an active
theory par excellence but it contains no hint of extramission.
Sheldrake praises Gibson’s theory because it “leaves open the
possibility of an interaction between the perceiver and the
perceived.” But this is crazy – for what theory does not? Vision is
and must be an ongoing interaction between the perceiver and
perceived. By confusing two fundamentally different distinctions
between theories of vision Sheldrake has created nothing but an
unhelpful muddle.
Reference
O'Regan, J.K. and Noë, A. (2001) A sensorimotor
account of vision and visual consciousness. Behavioral and Brain
Sciences, 24(5), 939-1011
